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Abstract
Cryptography - the art of secure communications, has been developed at least
over 2500 years. Still at present, no perfectly secure as well as practically suitable
classical or quantum cryptosystem exist. Statistically encoding the individual bit,
here we present a practical key distribution technique which is absolutely secure
both for classical and quantum keys. To achieve perfect security, noise has to be
strategically introduced. Noise, a detrimental factor, which never becomes help-
ful anywhere in classical and quantum information theory, can be used as a gift
of nature in our cryptosystem since fundamentally the coding of this cipher sys-
tem does not follow the standard technique of classical and quantum information
processing.
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In cryptography, only Vernam cipher [1] provides perfect security [2] if the same key, initially shared
between the legitimate users, is not used second time. As the same key can not be repeatedly used,
it is an impractical cipher system for global use. Due to the non-existence of practically suitable
secure cipher system, data encryption standard (DES) [3] and public key distribution (PKD)
technique [4] are used as alternative modes of secure communications. The DES and PKD systems
do not provide perfect security but can give computational security. To break these systems, code
breaker needs computing machine, which is a dicult task for a computer but not so dicult
for a chain of computers that has been demonstrated in many ways. As the issue is security
one can smell the existence of such network. Perhaps, because of this doubt, Vernam cipher is
still routinely used in some diplomatic communications. Moreover, development of faster classical
computer or simple quantum computer might challenge the computational security of DES/PKD
systems in future. So there was demand for new type of cryptosystem. Around 1970, Wiesner
[5] rst realised that laws of quantum mechanics can be used to ensure security. Bennett and
Brassard shaped this fascinating idea in their BB-84 [6] quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol.
As an alternative to the BB-84 protocol, Ekert in his EPR protocol showed [7] that in non local
quantum mechanics, violation of Bell’s inequality can be a signature of eavesdropping. Bypassing
Bell’s inequality, however, EPR type protocol can be given [8] still Ekert’s paper is signicant
because security issue, for the rst time, has been linked with the conceptual problem of quantum
mechanics. After that many EPR and non EPR protocols have been proposed [8-13]. As security
is ensured by quantum mechanics, it seems to be superior cryptosystem. Guided by this notion,
many experiments have been performed [14-16] although it was known that raw QKD protocols
do not provide full security. It’s security can be jeopardised due to noise. In recent years, on the
basis of classical and quantum error correction methods, security [17-21] and complete security
[22] proofs of QKD protocols have been presented considering i) restricted kind of eavesdropping
attacks [17,18] ii) some particular type of noise models [19-21] iii) perfectly fault-tolerant quantum
computer [22]. But for practical QKD protocols, full security can not be proved [23-24]. Very
recently it has been shown that all existing practical QKD protocols are insecure [25] . Besides
practical security crisis, conceptual problem of QKD is that in addition to the quantum channel,
it requires classical channel and classical authentication technique to operate. Recently we have
shown [26], completely QKD is also possible relying on quantum channel only. In fact, classical
channel and classical authentication technique can not be used in our system.
In our alternative key distribution procedure, two dierent sequences of quantum or classical
states represent two bit values. These two sequences are shared between the legitimate users. Their
task is to produce arbitrarily long chain of bits repeatedly using the two shared sequences. It is
trivial to mention that repetitive use of our bit values (i.e. sequences) is not ruled out by Shannon
theory of secrecy systems [2]. Shannon theory only rules out the repetition of the key not the bit
values. In ideal environment, this has already been revealed [26] in our quantum key. To illustrate





jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i jli j$i j$i jli jli j$i :::::
j$i jli jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i j$i j$i jli jli ::::
j$i jli jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i j$i j$i jli jli ::::
jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i jli j$i j$i jli jli j$i ::::
jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i jli j$i j$i jli jli j$i :::
j$i jli jli jli j$i jli j$i j$i j$i j$i jli jli :::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::

















The right side column stands for the bit values of the key. This key is prepared by two random
sequences of a pair of random orthogonal quantum states. This key is basically a classical key




j$i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i :::
j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i :::
j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i :::
j$i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i :::
j$i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i :::
j%.i j%.i j$i j$i j$i j%.i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i j%.i j$i :::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::

















This key is prepared by two random sequences of two same random non orthogonal quantum states.
This is a quantum key because states can not be exactly cloned[27].
How to break these keys: The knowledge of the full sequences is not necessary to break
the keys. It can be broken if identical and non identical bit value sequences can be distinguished
taking marginal statistics. The correlation test can simply be done by using any two sequences.
In KC , the probability (pii) of correlated elements of any two identical bit value sequences is 1
and the probability (pij) of correlated elements of any two non identical bit value sequences is
1/2. Therefore pii = 2pij . As their ratio is not same, the key can be broken. To break the
classical key, measurement does not play any role. In contrast, quantum key can also be broken
if sequence of measurements is systematically chosen. Here identical sequence of operations is
the best choice. In the above quantum key, as the sequences are prepared by the same pair of
non orthogonal states, a POVM (positive operator valued measure) can be used for correlation
test. The conclusive information of POVM for both the states will yield pii = 2pij . Interestingly
this is same for inconclusive information. It means conclusive information is not at all required
to break the key. The example: quantum key of two dierent random sequences of j$i; jli; j%.i
and j-&i states. In this key, none of the states can be conclusively distinguished because density
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matrix of the states j$i, and jli is same with the density matrix of the states j%.i and j-&i. Still
identical and non identical sequences of this quantum key can be distinguished by the inconclusive
results of individual measurement. Hence both quantum and classical keys are insecure. The is
true as all the sequences (the whole key) are available at a time to a code breaker to perform the
correlation test. In ideal environment, by quantum authentication (QA) strategy [26] KQ can be
made secure but KC is not. In QA strategy, code breaker is allowed to intercept the sequences but
if he/she does not resend any sequence, the next sequence will not be sent. Under this constrain,
eavesdropper will be forced to introduce error if he/she wants to eavesdrop. The QA will fail in
presence of noise. Because of noise, Eavesdropper, without introducing any error, can get some
of the elements of every sequence of any quantum keys belonging to our procedure to pursue the
correlation test. The advantage of uncertainty principle is lost as noise is present.
As quantum mechanics fails to protect our system, only mathematical method is left. If mathe-
matics can ensure security in presence of noise then it should be applicable both for KQ and KC .
The above analysis suggests that system will be perfectly secure, if code breaker does not get any
meaningful correlation among the sequences. Or simply if Pii becomes equal to Pij , then all the
sequences appears to be identical to a code breaker. But Pii is not equal to Pij so how would we
make it equal to the code breakers ? This apparently impossible task can be made possible by
eectively introducing error in the elements of the sequences without corrupting the bit value of
the sequences. Introduced error does not corrupt the bit values since individual bit is statistically
encoded. Of course error can not be arbitrarily high. How much error can be introduced will
be dependant on the statistics. If statistics is enough, individual bit can be perfectly recovered
from noise without employing error correcting codes. In contrast, in classical (Shannon) or quan-
tum information theory, individual bit is not statistically encoded, so noise necessitates the use of
classical or quantum error correcting codes to recover some of the bits.
Firstly we shall describe the error introduction strategy in a simple classical system. The basic
idea behind this protocol is that a sequence of one type of element will be corrupted in two dierent
ways to represent two bit values. This is equivalent to choosing two sequences for two bit values.
Suppose the sequence is
S = f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ::::::::g. This sequence can be represented by two dierent sub
sequences (denoted by  and ) of elements 1. S = f           :::::::g, where
probability of  position is same with the probability of  position (p = p) in the sequence S.
The sub sequences  and  are shared between sender and receiver. Apart from environmental
noise these sub sequences of  and  can be further corrupted by two error-introducing systems
X and Y. Considering natural error, two dierent probabilistic error px and py can be xed by X
and Y. For bit 0, sender introduces error px and py in the sub sequences  and  respectively.
Now sequence S can be termed as probabilistic sequence, Sp, where each element is denoted by
its error probability. Sp0 = fpx py py px py px py py px px py px::::g Similarly, for bit 1, error
px and py will be introduced in the sub sequences  and  respectively, then Sp will be S
p
1 =
fpy px px py px py px px py py px py:::::g.
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px py py px py px py py px px py px ::::
py px px py px py px px py py px py ::::
py px px py px py px px py py px py ::::
px py py px py px py py px px py px ::::
px py py px py px py py px px py px ::::
py px px py px py px px py py px py ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : ::::

















All rows (columns also) are having same error pz, where pz = 1=2(px + py). The receiver can
easily distinguish the bit values of the corrupted sequences as he knows the sub sequences  and 
provided bits are statistically distinguishable. But code breaker has to go through the correlation
test as he/she does not know the sub sequences  and . The correlation test will yield pii = pij .
Our objective has been fullled, yet it is not a loophole-free crypto-system because code breaker
can get large probability of repetition of the same error sequence of marginal number (say 10)
of elements. The identical error sequences carry same bit values because it can only appear for
identical probabilistic sequences Sp. The code breaker can wait for the identical error sequences of
marginal number of elements. If this repetition probability (pr) can not be made zero to the code
breaker, the system will not be perfectly secure. Simple modication will be required to reach to
our goal.
Here S can be represented as a composition of three sub sequence of ,  and γ.
So S = fγ γ γ γ γ   γ γ γ γ γ γ   γ::::g, where p = p, but less than pγ , the probability of γ
position in the sequence of S. Apart from the devices X and Y, we need another error introducing
device Y which can produce error pz. Now error pz, px and py will be introduced in the sub
sequences γ,  and  respectively to represent bit 0 and error pz, py and px will be introduced in





pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ::::
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ::::
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ::::
pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ::::
pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ::::
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ::::
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ::::

















Again the probability of error in columns (also in rows) is same which is pz. Due to the presence
of pseudo-elements (position of γ), code breaker’s marginal statistics will have to be increased.
Increasing the number of pseudo-elements, the probability of repetition (pr) of error sequences of
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real elements (positions of  and ) can be made zero for arbitrarily long period of time to the
eavesdropper.
It is trivial to mention that single sequence S can be a sequence of elements 0 or elements 0 and
1 also. Even two dierent random sequences of elements 0 and 1 can be used. When pz = 1=2, all
the above type of uncorrupted sequences will essentially give random sequences of elements 0 and
1 in rows and in columns. The error introduction strategy is also applicable for quantum sequence
but error has to be xed for a xed basis of measurement. We have seen that noise makes quantum
cryptosystem insecure but in this approach, noise makes our classical and quantum cryptosystems
perfectly secure. However at present, the use of quantum states in cryptography will be impractical.
It will reduce the bit rate and distance of implementation, because of the non-existence of quantum
repeater. But theoretical study on quantum cryptography remains to be interesting. It can lead
to new new quantum games and also broaden our understanding of cryptography and quantum
mechanics. The practical point of view, needless to say, classical system will be suitable. Moreover,
at transmitting and receiving centre, we have to use classical information processing technique to
control the classical devices to speed up communications.
To get the flavour of the eciency of this system, let us assume pz = 1=2, px = 1=4 and py = 3=4
and the numbers of γ,  and  are 104, 102 and 102 respectively i.e. pγ : p : p = 100 : 1 : 1. So
code breaker’s minimum statistics should be greater than 100. The probability of repetition (pr) of
error sequences of real elements will be less than 2−100. Hence 2100 bits will be perfectly secure (pr
= 0 for 100 elements). Using 109 pulses/sec, absolutely secure  105 bit/sec can be transmitted
over 1017 years ! The practical advantage of this system is that secure message can be directly
transmitted. As noisy apparatus is preferable, secure communications might be economical.
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